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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE DIS-
CONNECTION OF PART OF THE 
TERRITORY OF WEST JORDAN, 
INC. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
In reply to Respondent's Brief filed on appeal, we 
wish to redirect the Court's attention to the question 
before the Courts namely, whether the area seeking dis-
connection comes within the provisions of Sections 10-
4-1, 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as being land "within 
and lying upon the borders" of the incorporated town. 
We particularly point this out because much of 
the substance of respondent's brief (particularly pages 
7-9) resorts to what respondent terms "inferences" to 
be assumed from the findings, conclusions of law and 
judgment in it favor. These so-called inferences are not 
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justified and seem to be calculated to avoid the juris-
dictional question before this Court. 
It might be helpful to here set forth the pertinent 
portions of Sections 10-4-1 and 10-4-2: 
"10-4-1. * * * Whenever a majority of the real 
property owners in territory within and lying up-
on the borders of any incorporated city or town 
shall file with the clerk of the district court of 
the county in which such territory lies a petition 
praying that such territory be disconnected there-
from, and such petition sets forth reasons why 
such territory should be disconnected from such 
city or town, and is accompanied with a map or 
plat of the territory sought to be disconnected 
* * * Issue shall be joined and the case tried as 
provided for the trial of civil causes as nearly 
as may be. 
"10-4-2. * * * If the court finds that the pe-
tition was signed by a majority of the reaj^jprop-
^i^XJXWTiPirs^Ohe^territory concerned and that 
the allegations of the petition are true and that 
/s%Z justice and equity require that such territory or 
any part thereof should be disconnected from 
such city or town, it shall appoint three disinter-
ested persons as commissioners to adjust the 
term upon which such part shall be so severed 
as to any liabilities of such city or town that 
have accrued during the connection of such part 
with the corporation, and as to the mutual prop-
erty rights of the city or town and the territory 
to be detached." 
In the trial court, the case was fully tried on its 
merits, and after consideration of all the evidence, the 
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trial court found all of the issues in favor of petitioners, 
appellants herein, and on the grounds alleged in the 
petition entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law under date of January 5, 1960 (R. 9-11). Pending 
the appointment of commissioners to adjust mutual 
property rights, respondent (the town) filed its motion 
(R. 12) on January 12, 1960, to set aside the findings 
and conclusions or in the alternative grant a new trial. 
The Court did not grant a new trial, nor vacate or 
set aside the findings of fact entered January 5, 1960, 
(R. 9-11), but made additional findings (R. 14-17) bear-
ing solely on the question of wrhether the area seeking 
disconnection was "within and lying upon the borders of 
the town." This was the sole question concerning which 
further argument and briefs were requested and passed 
upon. Bearing upon this question, the Court on March 
17, 1960, made a further finding (R. 14) as to the ap-
proximate shape of the area seeking disconnection, and 
that such area did not "come within the requirements 
of Section 10-4-1, U.C.A. 1953" of being within and 
upon the borders of the town. The sole conclusion of law 
then made by the Court was as follows: 
"1 . The area seeking disconnection does not 
come within the statute of being 'within and lying 
upon the borders' of the towTn of West Jordan 
and therefore, notwithstanding prior findings of 
the Court, the petition for disconnection must be 
denied." (R. 15) 
It seems abundantly clear from reading the preface 
to the Findings of Fact prepared by respondent's coun-
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sel wherein it states that "Notwithstanding the prior 
findings of his Court," (R. 14) that Judge Anderson 
did not intend thereby to vacate or set aside his prior 
Findings of Fact and in effect modified or amended such 
findings only in the one respect, namely, that the area 
seeking disconnection did not meet the requirements 
of the statute as lying "within and upon the borders of 
the town." 
This modification or amendment of the findings and 
judgment falls within the purpose of Rule 52(b), which 
authorizes the trial court to amend the findings and 
judgment upon timely motion made. 
However, whatever doubt there may have been in 
regard to this question is conclusively laid to rest by 
reason of the Order dated March 21, 1960 (R. 17). This 
order was entered at the suggestion of the court at the 
time counsel for both sides was advised as to the ruling 
of the court on the jurisdictional question raised by 
respondent in order that this court would be adequately 
advised as to the basis of his decision on the merits 
since the reasons set forth there was not included in the 
Findings of Fact entered January 5, 1960. This order 
specifically reads: 
"2. Except for the dismissal of the petition 
in this cause by reason of this court not having 
jurisdiction due to the location of the area seek-
ing disconnection with respect to the border of 
the town, the following additional findings of 
fact would have been made and entered and this 
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is not done at this time because the same are not 
necessary in view of the action of this court: 
"(1) The Utah-Idaho Sugar Company and 
other petitioners were not given ade-
quate notice prior to the bond election 
authorizing the issuance of the sewer 
bonds to adequately protect their 
property a n d interest against the 
bonding of the town through general 
obligation bonds and disseminated in-
formation prior to the election with 
respect to the financing of said bonds 
which was not correct. 
"(2) A representative of the Town of West 
Jordan prevented the erroneous infor-
mation referred to above from being 
corrected at the only mass meeting 
held prior to the bond election. 
"Dated this 21st day of March, 1960. 
By the Court: 
/ s / Aldon J. Anderson 
JUDGE" 
Most of the authorities cited by respondent in its 
brief are cases in which the lower court was upheld in 
affirming that the petition should not be granted because 
the injurious effect of such disconnection outweighed 
the cause for granting it, whereas the lower court here 
found that no substantial harm would result to the area 
not seeking disconnection by the granting of this peti-
tion (K. 10—Finding No. 6). Eespondent would disre-
gard this important distinction by its statement on page 
2 of its brief, last paragraph, "This question is much 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
the same whether considered as jurisdictional, or, as a 
fact to be determined under all the circumstances and 
under all the evidence to be presented in the case." Re-
spondent then proceeds to contend that this court should 
infer that the lower court actually found contrary to 
Finding of Fact No. 6 entered January 5, 1960 (E. 10) 
since the lower court refused to grant its Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 6) before trial. 
In Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P. (2) 
1195, the court severed a portion of the area seeking 
disconnection and specifically made comment of the fact 
that symmetry was a matter of "justice and equity" 
and the particular shape of the area was not the sole 
consideration. The court also made comment of the fact 
that loss of income derived from taxation of such land 
was an insufficient ground or reason for refusing seg-
regation. Certainly that case does not stand for the 
proposition that the trial court does not have juris-
diction to consider the merits of any application for 
disconnection by reason of the fact that an area projects 
into the remainder of the town. It is, of course, import-
ant for the court to determine what effect this projection 
has upon the proper functioning of the area remaining 
in the town and this aspect of the case at bar was thor-
oughly investigated in this extended trial and the lower 
court resolved that issue against the respondent and 
refused to alter its position in this regard after con-
cluding that it had been in error as to the jurisdictional 
aspect of this petition. 
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As to the Anaconda case, it is surprising that coun-
sel for respondent would urge this court to follow the 
decision in that case despite many reasonable grounds 
for distinction pointed out in appellants' brief without 
even discussing those distinctions. If cases having simi-
lar facts but not substantially the same on all facts were 
urged as precedents, the courts would have an even 
more difficult task than they do in determining what 
the law is. 
It is obvious that any disconnection of part of a 
town's terrritory is injurious to it, if only from the 
revenue aspect, which is the motivating reason for re-
sisting practically all such applications. In many, if not 
most, of the petitions for disconnection, the area seeking 
disconnection projects to a greater or lesser extent 
into the town area and, to that extent, one would pre-
sume that there is some injurious effect aside from the 
loss of revenue. However, the actual extent of this injury 
cannot be determined merely by looking at the shape 
of the area seeking disconnection and its relationship 
to the remaining portions of the town because the entire 
city area of some cities and towns is very complex 
because of its residential and industrial area whereas 
other towns, such as West Jordan, have large portions 
of rural and agricultural lands included where they were 
originally incorporated for such purposes as having a 
cemetery, as was West Jordan, or for some other pur-
pose where the boundaries have little relation to the 
town's functions except to the extent of the area included 
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for revenue purposes. The fundamental question, there-
fore, for this court to determine is whether or not the 
trial court has jurisdiction to consider an application 
for disconnection, and thus determine the actual extent 
of the claimed injury, or whether injury too severe to 
tolerate must conclusively be presumed to exist in accord-
ance with the supposed intent of the legislature when 
most of the area seeking disconnection does not have its 
boundary contiguous to the boundaries of town. Town 
boundaries, of course, are of such widely varying shapes 
that both the town here and North Salt Lake had islands 
within them prior to the disconnection proceedings in 
this case and in the case of Hotvard v. Town of North 
Salt Lake, 7 U. (2) 278, 323 P. (2) 261. It hardly seems 
likely that the legislature would declare that the injury 
ipso facto to a town would be so much greater because 
the shorter side of the rectangle (or an irregular area 
as here) was the portion contiguous to the borders of the 
town than if the longer side of such an area were con-
tiguous that the court could properly consider the actual 
injury suffered by the town in the latter case but not 
the former. 
In the case of Greenwood Village v. Heckendorf, 126 
Colo. 180, 247 P. (2) 678, cited by on page six of respond-
ent's as following the Anaconda case, the question was 
not whether a sufficient portion of the area seeking 
disconnection was on the border but rather as there 
stated by the Court (P. 681): 
"Did the trial court err in striking the sev-
enth defense contained in the answer, which al-
leged that the disconnection sought would divide 
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the town into two areas Avholly separated from 
each other ?" 
In answer the Court then said: 
"This question must be answered in the af-
firmative. The disconnection of land from a town 
cannot be permitted where the result thereof 
would be to divide the municipality into two areas 
wholly isolated from each other." (Emphasis 
added) 
In Mogaard v. City of Garrison, 47 N.D. 468, 182 
N.W. 758, cited page six of respondent's brief, the basis 
of the decision appears to have been primarily that 
mandamus was not the proper remedy, and petitioners 
did not meet the mandatory conditions of the statute 
requiring a showing that no municipal sewers, water 
mains, etc. had been made of constructed in the area, 
In Lincoln Addition Improvement Company v. Len-
hart, 50 N.D. 25, 195 N.W. 14, also cited page six of 
respondent's brief, a right of way of the Northern Pa-
cific Railway extended along the east edge of the town 
between the town border and the area seeking discon-
nection. The opinion is not clear as to how much, if 
any, of the railroad right of way was within the area 
seeking disconnection, but the court did comment that, 
considering the railroad right of way, the area was not 
contiguous for jurisdictional and transportation pur-
poses. No similar situation exists in the instant case. 
In Swanson v. the City of Fairfield, 155 Neb. 682, 53 
N.W.(2) 90, the effect would be to "leave a boot of 
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urban land projecting into rural land." (This boot con-
sisted of a residential area three blocks wide and seven 
blocks long.) Certainly no city blocks or residential area 
will project into the farming land because of the dis-
connection in this case, and, conversely, no boot of farm-
ing land is projected into urban land here either. 
Regarding the authorities cited, respondent has not 
seen fit to comment on the case of Town of Gypsum v. 
Lundgren, 61 Colo. 332, 157 P. 195. In that case, the 
statute provided: 
"That whenever a tract or contiguous tracts 
of land aggregating twenty (20) or more acres 
in area are embraced within the corporate limits 
* * *, the owner or owners * * * may petition * * * 
to have the same disconnected." 
Three land owners petitioned for disconnection. Only 
one of these three tracts (fourteen and a fraction acres) 
owned by Lundgren bordered on the exterior limits of 
the town. The other tracts did not, but were contiguous 
to the Lundgren tract. In granting disconnection, the 
court said: 
"The words ' tract or tracts ' apply to the 
pieces making the aggregate of 20 acres or more 
in the city or town. The words following 'and 
being upon or contiguous to the border thereof 
apply to the 20 acres or more as a unit for con-
sideration under the petition. The context thus 
indicates. This position is strengthened when we 
consider section 2, whcih provides that : 
" ' Such petition shall show to the court that 
such tract or tracts of land contain in the aggre-
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gate an area of twenty or more acres, upon or 
adjacent to the border of said city or town.' 
"We thus find in this section a recognition 
of the 20 acres or more as a unit which is re-
quired to be upon or adjacent to the border of 
the town. To hold otherwise would be to say that 
this land could be disconnected if owned by one 
person but that it could not, if owned by three. 
This might be a discrimination without a reason 
for it." 
We believe this decision is particularly pertinent 
as illustrating that the statute should be given a practi-
cal interpretation, that all land owners contiguous to 
and having a community and continuity of interest with 
lands lying upon the border should not be denied the 
right to join in a petition for severance. In the instant 
case, the trial court recognized and found that all of 
the area seeking disconnection had a community or con-
tinuity of interests and found: 
"4. The portion of the town seeking dis-
connection # * * consists essentially of farms, 
dairies, and a sugar factory and is agricultural 
and rural in nature, whereas the remaining por-
tion, that is the portion of said town not seeking 
disconnection, includes within its confines the 
business and residential area. 
"5. Part of the sewer system is now in-
stalled and that portion was planned and de-
signed to serve that portion of the town not 
seeking disconnection and does not presently 
serve the area seeking disconnection, and peti-
tioners do not presently receive any benefit com-
mensurate with the obligation to which they would 
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be subjected by reason of said bonded indebted-
ness and would not even if the sewer system were 
extended to include their area. 
"6. The portion of the town seeking dis-
connection is not necessary to the incorporated 
area for the purpose of continuing its general 
town purposes and such disconnection will not 
result in any substantial harm to the area not 
seeking disconnection. 
"7. That justice and equity require that the 
property sought to be disconnected and which is 
hereafter described be disconnected from the in-
corporated Town of West Jordan." (R. 9-10) 
If the trial court had jurisdiction to disconnect the 
particular lands lying approximately one-half mile on 
the southern border, ivliich most certainly it did, then 
the court, having jurisdiction, we submit, had jurisdic-
tion to disconnect the adjoining lands similarly affected. 
The legislative intent should in justice be given this 
practical application. I t would not be practical, nor just, 
to require that each contiguous land owner should be 
required to file separate petitions or to say that the 
court had jurisdiction to disconnect the property owners 
whose lands bordered the Southern boundary of the town 
and then leave each adjacent property owner then lying 
on the borders to separately petition to accomplish the 
same end result. Under its powers of "equity and justice'' 
Avhich favored disconnection of the entire unit, the court 
having jurisdiction should not be so restricted when 
such result would be to deny "equity and justice." 
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Usually the same requirements for annexation or 
extension of corporate limits are required as are re-
quired for disconnection. In Utah this is permitted under 
Section 10-3-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, by two-thirds 
vote of the town board, without a court hearing, as to 
lands lying "contiguous" to the town limits. Certainly 
the Town of West Jordan, or other municipalities, have 
never accepted the intrepretation of Section 10-3-1 as 
limiting them to just the immediate property owners 
adjacent to the town. If so, they would have to proceed 
by successive proceedings to annex each adjacent prop-
erty owner to validate such annexation. "Contiguous 
territory is treated similarly to lying on the borders or 
boundary in Village of Niobrara, 158 Neb. 517, 63 N.W. 
(2) 867. The power of the village to annex territory 
was limited to annexing "contiguous terri tory." In that 
case the court denied annexation because the record 
failed to show that any part of the territory sought to 
be annexed to the village was contiguous to it, or that 
"any part of the boundary of the area is coexistent with 
a part of the boundary of the village." 
In the instant case, the area seeking disconnection 
is surrounded by the remaining portion of the Town 
of West Jordan on the east, north and west, as illus-
trated by the map following page two of respondent's 
brief. Particularly when the trial court found that justice 
and equity on all issues favored disconnection, it can-
not be said that such disconnection would gut or divide 
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the town as contended by respondents. The findings of 
the Court are to the contrary. 
Counsel for respondent concede that the lower 
court would have had jurisdiction to have entered the 
decree of severance if the legislature had used the word 
"standing" instead of the word " lying." It is respect-
fully submitted, however, that land does not stand or 
lie but is situated with reference to and that both con-
notations import that the land standing or lying touches 
the reference referred to in the statute. 
As a matter of statutory construction that con-
struction is to be preferred wThich permits the cause to 
be determined on its merits and which avoids a multi-
plicity of suits. The application of either of these two 
principles to the statute in question would resolve this 
case in appellants' favor. Otherwise the appellant pe-
titioners whose property is closest to the southern 
boundary of West Jordan may petition for disconnection 
despite this prior dismissal, which was not on the merits. 
If granted the relief Judge Anderson determined they 
were entitled to on the merits, then those adjacent to 
the new southern boundary may do likewise with the 
effect pointed out in appellant's first brief (and which 
was not discussed in respondent's brief). One of the 
justifiable criticisms of the law and legal procedures is 
that the results many times are not reasonably related to 
what is right or fair. Such a result is to be avoided 
unless the statute in question cannot reasonably be con-
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strued otherwise. It is respectfully submitted that this 
statute cannot only be reasonably construed otherwise but 
that it is more reasonable to construe in such other 
fashion. 
In the instant case, if the petitioners are not allowed 
to disconnect themselves from the Town of West Jordan 
the effect will be to require them to pay a large portion 
of the taxes and bonded indebtedness without any or 
equal benefits. Such result is not to serve equity and 
justice, but to defeat the same, and of necessity to force 
farmers and industry out of the community. 
We repectfully submit that the trial court was in 
error in finding it lacked jurisdiction, and that the judg-
ment should be reversed and the trial court directed to 
grant a decree of severance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for Petitioners 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
Attorney for Petitioners 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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